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Abstract: This paper introduces some of the results of an empirical 
field study within a large technical system (high pressure gas 
transmission network), exploited by one company, in which safety 
results from a combination of anticipation and resilience obtained by a 
‘mixture’ of individual expertise, team coordination and organisational 
context favouring the tasks carried out at the ‘sharp end’. High pressure 
gas transmission presents itself as a network of pipelines for which one 
threat are ‘external aggressions’, such as damages occurring when 
tractors dig, for instance, trenches for civil, municipal or urban 
engineering projects. In a first section, some elements of definition of 
‘large technical system’ (LTS) is provided; it introduces some of the 
specific features met in these types of systems. In a second section, after 
a presentation of the methodological and theoretical elements, a 
description of the safety measures designed within this LTS for 
prevention of external aggression is offered. In a third section, a first 
and heuristic (for further developments) model of resilience, inferred 
from observations and interviews, and inspired from the literature on 
‘macro cognition’ and ‘collective mindfulness’ is presented. Finally, in 
a last section, some thoughts about the translation from description to 
action (‘engineering’) of resilience (whether creating, maintaining or 
improving resilience) are suggested.  
 
1. HIGH PRESSURE GAS TRANSMISSION AS A LARGE 
TECHNICAL SYSTEM (LTS) 
This paper presents some of the results of an empirical study investigating the way in 
which safety is produced in normal operation within a ‘large technical system’ (LTS) in 
charge of high pressure gas transmission. The analytical category of LTS was developed 
about twenty years ago to describe numerous infrastructures (networks) that appeared to 
share common features. One pioneer in the field is the historian of technology Hughes 
(1983) who studied electricity network, from its invention to its wide spread throughout 
society. This work allowed in the following years to spark interest in the research 
community and to gather other researchers already partly involved in this area (two 
important conferences were held in the eighties  on this subject, leading to the 
publication of two books, Mayntz, Hughes, 1988, La Porte, 1991). In all these 
contributions, it is made explicit that beyond the electrical case studied by Hughes, it is 
interesting to identify a much wider category of systems, which, according to Joerges 
(1988, 24) ‘(1) are materially integrated, or ‘coupled’ over large spans of space and 
time, quite irrespective of their particular cultural, political, economic and corporate 
  
 
make-up, and (2) support or sustain the functioning of very large numbers of other 
technical systems, whose organisations they thereby link.’  For this author, examples of 
LTS can, as a consequence, be ‘integrated transport systems, telecommunication 
systems, water supply systems, some energy systems, military defense systems, urban 
integrated public works’, etc.  
Of course, with a safety perspective, a very well studied case of LTS comes to mind: 
aviation. From pilot’s psychological models elaborated by cognitive scientists to cabin 
crew communication and coordination issues (leading to crew resource management 
programs) as well as atc studies (air traffic control) by high reliability organization 
researchers, there is a very large literature dedicated to the safety aspects of this LTS. 
However, other LTS have not been granted as much attention as aviation has been 
granted in the past decades of research on safety, at least to the authors knowledge. One 
can think of electrical grid or gas transmission networks, although serious safety issues 
are also associated with them. A ‘black out’ can have severe indirect consequences on 
the exploitation of highly hazardous technological installations. A recent incident in a 
nuclear power plant in Sweden in 2006 demonstrated this when its diesel generators 
failed to start as expected for cooling down the reactor’s core, following a ‘black out’ of 
the electrical network supplying energy. Although an indirect consequence, the 
centrality of such a LTS, requires that its functioning becomes an integrated part of 
prevention of major hazard. As far as high pressure gas transmission networks are 
concerned, they can have direct (as well as indirect) consequences. One direct is the loss 
of containment of pressurized gas, leading, potentially, to fires.  
2. THE THREAT OF ‘EXTERNAL AGGRESSION’ 
One of the specificity of these LTS in general is that they are opened to potential 
‘external aggressions’, voluntary or not. Pipelines are not confined within the 
boundaries of an industrial site. They cover a very wide geographical area, and 
represent in France a total of 32 000 kms. As a result, one specific safety activity that 
has been considered in this research is the identification and prevention by the 
exploiting company of ‘external aggressions’ on gas pipelines. For a LTS such as high 
pressure gas transmission network, any urban, municipal or civil engineering (umce) 
work carried out nearby pipelines and requiring drilling or digging with tractors is a 
potential threat to their integrity.  
 Ghislenghien’s disaster (2004) 
The accident of Ghislenhien in Belgium in 2004 (24 persons killed, 132 severely 
injured) demonstrated what type of scenario could lead to major consequences. This 
accident was caused by a pipeline’s structure weakened following an ‘external 
aggression’, which would have been caused, from a ‘sharp end’ point of view and 
according to the current explanations, by a truck involved in umce nearby. After hitting 
the pipeline without noticing and/or informing the operating company of the pipelines 
about it, the incident remained totally unknown until the pressure increased in the 
pipeline and that the weakened structure, where the tractor hit, failed to contain the 
rising pressure. It created a high pressure gas leak, and then to a huge flame when 
ignited by a source of energy.  
This disaster is an illustration of the challenge faced by companies managing high 
pressure gas transmission networks for identifying, locating and assessing any works 
being performed nearby their pipelines. In this study, the company involved implements 
many levels of preventive measures ranging from national initiatives to local ones. The 
empirical observations have been restricted to local measures in this study. At this level, 
prevention is based on a decentralised mode of organising. For a given territory, a 
‘sector’ (composed of less than 10 individuals, in this case study, it was 6) is in charge 
of the maintenance and the surveillance of pipelines. The sector selected by the 
company for the study was considered as a ‘good’ one, with good results and with a 
good image within the organisation. Located in a complex urban context of a major city, 
it requires a high level of interaction between many different actors including 
  
 
engineering contracting and subcontracting companies, municipal employees, architects, 
etc.    
3. OBSERVING RESILIENCE IN LTS 
3.1. Elements of methodology and theory  
The approach retained for describing, understanding and explaining the activity of a 
team within a sector involved in prevention of ‘external aggression’ (through the angle 
of resilience) relied on participant observations and interviews. Interviews were 
conducted with the manager of the team and then the team members, with a focus on 
three of them involved, directly or indirectly, in prevention of ‘external aggression’. We 
saw them sometimes twice, in order to come back on some aspects missed in the first 
interview. These interviews were performed at times collectively but also individually, 
and oriented on specific topics, according on the function of the interviewee. Questions 
covered different topics including task complexity, expertise required (technical, 
relational) for handling work situations, relationship at work between employees and 
management, training, information flows about work issues and incidents, etc. 
Participant observations of activities within and outside the sector premises were 
performed, consisting in taking into account technological interfaces, communications 
and coordination between employees, the different steps followed for performing tasks, 
while interacting with employees from umce companies. When possible, some observed 
activities were questioned ‘on the spot’ (as someone learning his job would probably 
do). For example, following a decision that seemed to rely on a judgment that was 
unclear from an outsider point of view, it was asked to the employee, when possible, to 
explain about the rationale behind his decision.  
The main purpose of these series of interviews and observations was to get close to the 
specificity of the work activity at the ‘sharp end’. When interviews and observations 
were done separately by researchers, feedback sessions were organised between the 
observers in order to cross data, and discuss interpretations and hypotheses. Five days 
were spent observing and interviewing. This ‘immersion’ within the activity of the 
sector was prepared few weeks before, by a description and understanding of the more 
global (regulatory, economical, regulatory and political) context of this LTS. Several 
meetings with knowledgeable engineers and managers in this domain allowed the team 
of observers to get to know the context. Theoretical background for this study includes 
disciplines such as engineering, psychology, cognitive science, management and 
sociology applied to safety. The polysemous notion of resilience (Hollnagel et al, 2006) 
is defined in this research, at the ‘team level’ of investigation considered in this paper, 
as the adaptations (or tradeoffs) of individuals to situations within their technical and 
relational context, in normal operation. Resilience requires to be thought as a product of 
the interaction between technological, cognitive and social features.  
3.2. Main safety measures for preventing external aggressions  
In order to prevent ‘external aggressions’ on pipelines, a number of ‘defense in depth’ 
are implemented, ranging from technical to national level: 
 Technical: increased resistance of pipelines, mechanical protection, pipelines 
external (yellow) signalization. 
 Regulatory: demand of information about pipeline location by companies 
intending to dig (DR ‘demande de renseignements’), declaration of start of projects 
(DICT ‘déclaration d’intention de commencement de travaux’)  
 Operational: answer to demands of information (DR), risk assessment at work 
site following DICT by companies digging for umce work, surveillance of work 
sites and pipelines.  
 Organisational: training of organisation’s employees, information to 
municipalities and civil, urban or municipal engineering companies about the 
regulation (DR, DICT), incident analysis at national level.  
  
 
It is the operational type of measures that were investigated in this case study, leaving in 
the background, although equally important but not discussed in this paper but partly 
investigated in this study.  
4. Some results  
4.1. A task requiring constant adaptations 
One very explicit feature of the task of preventing ‘external aggressions’ appeared to be 
the ability of some ‘home made’ experts to adapt to daily variations of work constraints. 
Whereas ideally, the task was supposed to be in the form of sequential steps, (figure 1), 
it turned out to be of a very different kind.   
 
Figure 1 : a sequential task, in theory 
In theory, preventing ‘external agression’ consists in receiving an information request (a 
‘DR’) by a company intending to perform umce work on a given area, asking the 
organisation exploiting the pipelines about the  presence or not of a pipeline nearby 
planned umce work. If it is a positive answer, then this company must warn the 
organisation (through a ‘DICT’) about the intended date of start so that an employee of 
the LTS exploitation can come and assess the situation on site. The employe of the LTS 
locates then the pipeline (using a specific equipment), indicates to the umce company 
some safety measure to be taken given the specific situation. This agent must then wait 
for the end of the project to identifty any damages that would have been caused to the 
pipeline. All this is represented in figure 2. This is however the theory. In reality, it is 
difficult to implement all these steps sequentially. First, there are other activities not 
included, such as responding to invitation from umce companies to assist them before 
projects start, in order to get to know where the pipelines are. But there are also 
emergency engineering work that are to be treated immediately (such as for example 
water leak to be fixed by water enginnering companies which necessitates sometimes 
digging close to high pressure gas pipelines). Secondly, companies performing 
engineering work do not always warn ahead and call the very same day that they start. 
As it is not planned, solutions must be made to deal with the situation, and to establish 
priorities among schedule. Instead of a linear sequence of activities, observations 
quickly reveal a different adaptive type of task, involving multiple parallel activities 




























4.2. From a collective to an individual expertise 
All these activities cover a wide range of different aspects and skills: administrative, 
relational and technical. Depending on the time of year, workload varies.  In the most 
intensive of these periods, tradeoffs must be made between all these activities in order 
to allocate resources (time, expertise) for what they consider as the umce works nearby 
to pipelines deserving the closest watch. The coordination between the members of the 
team is then very important. Defined for example by Weick as one dimension of 
‘collective mindfulness’ (Weick, 2001), this collective side of the activity revealed in 
this case study interesting features among which a mix of stability and flexibility 
(Wildaavsky, 1988). In this team, it appeared that individual expertise was at the heart 
of the decision making process, when circumstances pressed for adaptive patterns. 
While not in the hand of the manager of the team (who hasn’t got a strong experience in 
the field of ‘external aggression’ prevention), great flexibility was granted to one of the 
individual in the team who was acknowledged as the most expert in this area.  
Organising his own schedule, he is in charge of balancing several factors for deciding in 
real time about the priorities when tradeoffs must be made. Of course, he relies on 
written procedures provided by the organisation but, given the specificity of local urban 
contexts, he has to adapt this procedure in order to achieve what seems to him to be a 
satisficing response (Simon, 1957) to his local constraints and unplanned demands. His 
choices have an impact on the team workload, as he can, at times, when it is required; 
ask a colleague (or even his manager) to replace him for a planned visit. While he is 
replaced, he is then able to deal with an unexpected situation, such as an emergency 
engineering work in a sensitive area for which he wishes to be present to ensure close 
supervision. This employee commented this situation as an unusual one, as he could 
‘give order to his own boss’. Whereas probably in many cases one could imagine the 
problem of such a situation, in this team, it was not an issue. A balance had been found 
between hierarchy and expertise, introducing here a key issue of power in teams (and 
more widely, in organisations, Le Coze, 2008). This is one side of the collective 
expertise of the team, which partly results from the managerial style of the team leader, 
willing to have an expert of the team leading some decisions for the rest of team, 
although not a manager.  
Beyond this collective side of expertise, and as a complement, what has proved also 
very interesting to identify and to investigate are elements of decision making process 
on which this individual expertise relies. Without attempting to produce a final model of 
such a complex topic as decision making, the strategy in this study was rather to see 
how collected data during interviews and observations could be exploited in order to 
indicate some of the key dimension of this individual expertise. In this respect, the 
(methodological and theoretical) approach was close to principles of ‘macro cognition’ 
or ‘cognition in the wild’, considering cognition to be the understood as individuals 
(‘cleverly’) adapting within their work context. Rather than expecting to fully 
understand cognition only through experiments (and also normative frameworks), field 
studies (‘in the wild’) become one input for the understanding of how cognition 
proceeds in face of complex and dynamic environments instead of simple and static 
ones. 
4.3. Towards a heuristic model of resilience in the domain of ‘external aggression’ 
One first step was to group together many of the data that this expert processed in his 
activity. A first set of six groups of key dimensions were identified. They combine 
many different sides implied by ‘external aggression’ prevention, among which 
‘itinerary’, ‘urban geography’, ‘pipeline’, ‘urban features’, ‘political context’ and 
‘engineering’.   Each group refers to specific topics, such as rush hour, depth of 
pipelines, umce companies, municipalities’ services etc (figure 4). It is clear from this 
  
 
description that only expertise acquired by individual from many years of experience is 
in a position to feel comfortable with the decision making process involved. One reason 
for having a specialised ‘expert’ in this team and to afford him flexibility of decision is 
to find an answer to this problem of knowing sufficiently well the area, the umce 
companies (see groups in figure 4) etc, in order to elaborate appropriate choices in real 
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Figure 4.Expertise at the center of many different topics 
One way to suggest a first model of resilience was as a consequence to introduce the 
notion of expertise at the heart of it, based on a combination of collective and individual 
expertise.  For describing expertise, Klein’s approach proved useful (Klein, 1998, 
2009). Synthethised through four key features: mental simulations, intuition, mastery of 
time horizon and knowledge by expert of his own limit, they were illustrated by some of 
the stories collected during observations and interviews. For example, cases of 
‘intuition’ or ‘mental simulations’ were used as illustration of how expertise shaped 
decisison making.  Combining the various features of the activity together led to the 
followin model (figure 5). Based on a wide range of data collected by the expert on 
many different topics (figure 4), divided in categories of ‘global context’ and ‘specific 
context’, individual expertise combined with collective expertise allow the team to 
adjust in real time their schedule in order to maximise the chance to be at ‘the right 
place at the right time’. 
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5. ‘ENGINEERING’ RESILIENCE  
Beyond the attempt to model or theorise on resilience within this LTS, there are also 
expectations for ‘engineering’ solutions. This ‘engineering’ side is the question of how 
to practically enhance, support, create or maintain resilience. This study is a start. The 
simple and heuristic models proposed consist in some indications about what direction 
to pursue. One key outcome of this case study is for the work of ‘external aggression’ 
prevention by experts to access a better visibility in the organisation. Comparisons 
between teams should provide more data and reference points to move forward. But 
other concrete applications of this initial model could be translated in current incident 
investigations which do not explicitly rely on this type of model acknowledging the 
collective and individual expertise behind the scene. One other concrete use is training 
of managers, but also of experts in sectors. The ability to better contextualize indicators 
with qualitative data is also one possible prospect along with possibilities of adapting 
audits for them to reflect the findings of this study, rather than strict compliance with 
rules which is a very difficult objective for teams in such a complex and open 
environment. A case study on normal operation with the intent to identify and describe 
resilient properties of individual and teams can lead to useful and practical outcomes. 
However, such a translation remains part of a research problem, when model and 
practical ideas need to be tested to prove their relevance, implying there again strong 
tradeoffs between purposes of description and transformation. A good description does 
not necessarily lead to practical tools to help transformation (Le Coze, Pettersen, 2008). 
6. CONCLUSION  
This study presented here had the purpose of observing some of the features of 
resilience and to imagine ways of being practical in order to promote, maintain or create 
resilience. After describing the specificity of LTS, and associating high pressure gas 
transmission network to this category, the paper introduced the threat of ‘external 
aggressions’ as one activity to be studied. LTS are opened systems that need to be 
managed in order to cope with this specific threat. The study relied on interviews and 
observations for approaching what could be seen as the resilient properties of team 
dealing with the prevention of ‘external aggressions’. The paper shows that a collective 
and an individual expertise, allowing flexibility and quality of decision making to be 
obtained, is necessary. A heuristic model, as a first attempt to capture characteristic of 
resilience within this LTS, has been suggested. It can serve as a basis for ‘engineering’ 
resilience, and will be completed in the future through comparisons with other sectors.  
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